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Abstract 
Population axiology concerns how to evaluate populations in terms of their moral goodness, that is, how to 
order populations by the relations “is better than” and “is as good as”. The task has been to find an adequate 
theory about the moral value of states of affairs where the number of people, the quality of their lives, and 
their identities may vary. So far, this field has largely ignored issues about uncertainty and the conditions 
that have been discussed mostly pertain to the ranking of risk-free outcomes. Most public policy choices, 
however, are decisions under uncertainty, including policy choices that affect the size of a population. Here, 
we shall address the question of how to rank population prospects—that is, alternatives that contain 
uncertainty as to which population they will bring about—by the relations “is better than” and “is as good 
as”. We start by illustrating how well-known population axiologies can be extended to population prospect 
axiologies. And we show that new problems arise when extending population axiologies to prospects. In 
particular, traditional population axiologies lead to prospect-versions of the problems that they praised for 
avoiding in the risk-free settings. Finally, we identify an intuitive adequacy condition that, we contend, 
should be satisfied by any population prospect axiology, and show how given this condition, the 
impossibility theorems in population axiology can be extended to (non-trivial) impossibility theorems for 
population prospect axiology.  
    
I. Introduction 
Population axiology concerns how to evaluate populations in terms of their moral goodness, that 
is, how to order populations by the relations “is better than” and “is as good as”. So far, discussions 
of population axiology have largely ignored the question of how to rank alternatives that contain 
uncertainty as to which population they will bring about. The adequacy conditions that have been 
discussed mostly pertain to the ranking of risk-free outcomes and are silent in regard to how to 
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rank risky prospects. In other words, questions about how to rank what we call population prospects, 
that is, a population prospect axiology, have not yet been much addressed.1  
This exclusion of uncertainty is unfortunate since most public policies that could affect the 
number and identities of future people contain a great deal of uncertainty as to which population 
they will bring about.2 To take a concrete example, suppose we are considering increasing the cost 
of childcare, which has the predictable effect that some couples will decide to have a child just in 
case they happen to find well-paid jobs (and thus decreases the probability that these couples have 
a child). When evaluating this policy, we might want to consider the interests of the children who 
will come into existence just in case the people who will then be their parents find well-paid jobs. 
But how, if at all, should the probability that these children may, and may not, exist, affect our 
evaluation of the policy in question?  
    How to rank population prospects has important implications for public policy choices, 
as the above example illustrates.3 For instance, if the probability of the non-existence of a possible 
person heavily detracts from the value of an alternative, then that gives us reason to resist any 
increase in the cost of childcare, but if the probability of the non-existence of a possible person is 
of, say, neutral value, then that makes it less objectionable to implement policies that are expected 
to have the effect that many possible and potentially very happy people will not come into 
existence.  
Apart from the need to consider population prospects for policy purposes, there is a 
theoretical motivation for introducing uncertainty into population ethics. One might hope that 
removing the idealizing assumption of certainty could help us avoid the impossibility results that 
have been troubling population ethicists for decades (REFERENCES). After all, removing 
information can result in a situation where an adequacy condition that is used in a theorem no 
longer applies. So, removing information that is necessary for a condition to apply could be seen 
as one possible way in which one can avoid an impossibility result involving that condition.4 In 
fact, that is what happens when one introduces risk and uncertainty into population ethics—that 
 
1 For important exception, see (Blackorby, Bossert, and Donaldson 2005),(Roberts 2007), (Asheim and Zuber 2016), 
(Nebel 2019), (Budolfson and Spears mimeo). (Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey 2016) and Nebel (2017) discuss prospects 
involving populations with different people but the same number of people. See also fn. 10.  
2 Contrary to the convention in economics, we use “uncertainty” and “risk” interchangeably throughout this paper. 
So, a situation of risk, and a situation of uncertainty, is one where one knows what outcome one’s choices might result 
in, but does not know which outcome one’s choice will result in. We shall assume that the probabilities that figure in 
our discussion are objective but nothing of substance hangs on this assumption. 
3 For further examples of this kind, see (Broome 1992, 2004, sec. 1.1., 2010, 2015). See also (Arrhenius forthcoming, 
ch 1) for a discussion.   
4 Cf. Arrhenius (forthcoming, sec. 6.4) discussion of how restriction on the measurement assumptions regarding 
welfare can help avoiding certain impossibility results in non-risky population axiology.   
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is, when one removes information about which state of the world is actual—since the traditional 
adequacy conditions for population axiology say nothing about how to rank what we call “non-
trivial” prospects, that is, prospects that confer probabilities strictly between zero and one to 
different populations (as we further explain below).  
An axiology for non-trivial prospect that is not plagued by impossibility results would 
moreover be a great victory from a practical point of view. Policies that could affect the size of a 
population typically contain considerable uncertainty, as previously mentioned. In fact, it is hard to 
think of any policy (population-affecting or not) that is certain to deliver a particular outcome. 
Therefore, one might think that, from a practical point of view, the impossibility results for risk-
free population axiology are not so important. What is important, from a practical point of view, 
is the possibility of an adequate population prospect axiology. For if we have an adequate 
population prospect axiology, then we will be able to make consistent population policy choices 
(since these are always choices between prospects), notwithstanding the traditional impossibility 
results for risk-free populations.5 
Unfortunately, it turns out that new problems appear when one tries to turn a population 
axiology into a population prospect axiology. Perhaps most surprisingly, we shall see that natural 
formulations of traditional (risk-free) population axiologies lead to prospect-versions of problems 
the avoidance of which in the risk-free setting is considered highly desirable features of these same 
axiologies.  
Moreover, we shall identify an intuitive adequacy condition that, we contend, should be 
satisfied by any betterness ordering of population prospects, but which opens the door to 
impossibility results for population prospect axiology that are analogous to the traditional 
impossibility results for (risk-free) population axiology. Importantly, these results cannot be derived 
just from the (risk-free) adequacy conditions involved in the traditional impossibility theorems, and 
they hold for non-trivial prospects (as well as for trivial ones), i.e., for prospects that confer 
probabilities strictly between zero and one on different populations. So, contrary to the 
aforementioned hope, removing the idealizing assumption of certainty will unfortunately not help 
us avoid the notorious impossibility results in population ethics. 
 
5 Another reason for exploring what happens when we introduce probabilities in population ethics, is that we 
know that there are some multi-person optimisation problems where a solution can be found only if we introduce 
probabilities. In particular, there are some well-known problems in game theory where a Nash equilibrium exists only if 
the “players” are allowed to randomise between their available “pure” (i.e., risk-free) strategies. In a similar vein, one 
might hope that a solution can be found to the problems of population ethics by introducing probabilities.  
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II. Population Prospect Axiologies 
A natural starting point in the search for a population prospect axiology is to consider some 
extensions of standard population axiologies to situations of uncertainty. But first, we need to 
introduce a few terms and distinctions used in traditional, risk-free, population axiology, which we 
will use when formulating the aforementioned extensions. 
A life, as we shall be using the term, is individuated by, first, who leads the life, and, second, 
the welfare of the person. Hence, there is more than one possible life that a person could lead. We 
will assume that the welfare measure is normalised around the “neutral” life, such that lives worth 
living have positive welfare but lives worth not living have negative welfare. (But we shall remain 
agnostic as to what welfare is and how to measure it.) Populations are individuated by the lives they 
contain. Therefore, populations are individuated by, first, the people they contain, and, second, the 
welfare of these people. Hence, two different populations could be made up of exactly the same 
people.  
In traditional population axiology, one distinguishes between the welfare of a life, i.e., how 
good or bad it is for the person living it, and the contributive value of a life. By the contributive 
value of a life we shall mean the value that a life confers on a population of which it is a member. 
More exactly, the contributive value of a life x relative to a population A, of which x is a member, 
is the difference in value between A and the population consisting of all the A-lives except x. This 
distinction is useful for population prospect axiology too, for we can now reformulate one of our 
main questions as “What is the contributive value of a possible life to a prospect?” 
With this terminology in hand, let’s consider how the traditional population axiologies could 
be extended to situations of uncertainty. We start with Total Utilitarianism, according to which the 
contributive value of a person’s life equals her welfare, and the value of a population is calculated 
by summing the welfare of all lives in the population.  
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In the above formula, n is the size of population X and ui is a numerical representation of 
the welfare of the ith life in population X.  
A natural way to turn Total Utilitarianism into a population prospect axiology, is to sum up 
weighted Total Utilitarian values of all the possible populations that a prospect might result in, 
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where the weight on the value of each population is determined by the probability that the prospect 
will result in that population.6  Let’s call the resulting axiology Prospect Total Utilitarianism. 
 
𝑃𝑇𝑈(𝑃) =∑𝑝(𝑠𝑖)𝑇𝑈(𝑃(𝑠𝑖)) =
𝑚
𝑖=1
𝑝(𝑠1)𝑇𝑈(𝑃(𝑠1)) + 𝑝(𝑠2)𝑇𝑈(𝑃(𝑠2)) + ⋯
+ 𝑝(𝑠𝑚)𝑇𝑈(𝑃(𝑠𝑚)) 
 
In the above formula, the si are mutually incompatible states of the world that determine in 
which population a population prospect results;7 P(si) is the population resulting from population 
prospect P in state si; and p(si) is the probability of si. So, according to Prospect Total Utilitarianism, 
the contributive value of a possible life to a prospect is positive (negative, neutral) if the life would 
have positive (negative, neutral) welfare and proportional to the probability of its realisation by the 
prospect. 
One of the great challenges that examinations of different size populations have raised for 
Total Utilitarianism, is how to respond to the fact that the latter gives rise to what Parfit (1984) 
called the Repugnant Conclusion:  
 
The Repugnant Conclusion: For any perfectly equal population consisting of people with 
very high positive welfare, there is a population consisting of people with very low 
positive welfare which is better, other things being equal.8  
 
 
6 The population prospects axiologies we formulate treat risk and uncertainty as standard expected utility theory does. 
There are reasons for being sceptical of that treatment; for instance, since it does not allow for risk aversion with 
respect to utility. However, to keep things simple, we shall assume the standard expected utility treatment of risk. It is 
easy to see that the results we shall discuss would still hold if we assumed some of the minimally normative alternative 
treatments of risk that have recently been suggested, that is, treatments that satisfy transitivity and stochastic 
dominance, such as the theories suggested by Quiggin (1982), Kahneman and Tversky (1992), Buchak (2013) and 
Stefánsson and Bradley (2015, 2019). In contrast, our results do not hold if one uses, say, the original Prospect Theory 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979), which cannot simultanously satisfy stochastic dominance and transitivity, or Regret 
Theory (Bell 1982, Loomes and Sugden 1982), which only satisfies transitivity w.r.t. a triple of alternatives if at least one 
alternative in the triple strictly dominates another alternative in the triple (Diecidue and Somasundaram 2017). While 
the latter theories may be accurate descriptions of how people actually order prospects, few if any scholars would 
suggest them as theories about how one ideally should order prospects. Therefore, we think that we can justifiably set 
them aside for the present purposes, where the aim is to discuss how one should order population prospects.  
7 In other words, states are pairwise incompatible but collectively exhaustive contingencies. 
8 See (Parfit 1984, p. 388). This formulation is more general than Parfit’s except that he doesn’t demand that the people 
with very high welfare are equally well off. The ceteris paribus clause means that the compared populations are roughly 
equal in all other putatively axiologically relevant aspect apart from individual welfare levels. Hence, other values and 
considerations are not decisive for the value comparison of involved populations. Although it is through Parfit’s 
writings that this implication of Total Utilitarianism became widely discussed, it was already noted by Henry Sidgwick 
(1907), p. 415, before the turn of the century (he didn’t claim that it was “repugnant”, however). For other early sources 
of the Repugnant Conclusion, see (McTaggart 1927, pp. 452-3; Broad 1930, pp. 249-50; and Narveson 1967). 
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It should be evident that the prospect version of Total Utilitarianism also leads to the 
Repugnant Conclusion not only in non-risky situations but also in risky ones. For instance, for any 
prospect P, all of whose possible outcomes are populations with lives with very high welfare, 
Prospect Total Utilitarianism will recommend choosing instead some prospect Q, all of whose 
possible outcomes are larger populations with lives with very low positive welfare. Here, the actual 
outcome, if we follow the recommendation of Prospect Total Utilitarianism, will be an instance of 
the Repugnant Conclusion. Likewise, for other undesirable implications of Total Utilitarianism in 
non-risky settings, such as the Very Repugnant Conclusion.9 
Moreover, Prospect Total Utilitarianism violates probabilistic analogues of the traditional 
(risky-free) Quality condition which essentially rules out the Repugnant Conclusion (and which we 
state in section 4). Consider the following probabilistic analogue, which can be derived from the 
non-probabilistic condition with help of a dominance condition that we discuss in section 4: 
 
Probabilistic Quality: There is a perfectly equal population with very high welfare, A, 
such that for some population X and any probability p and any population C with very 
low welfare (positive or negative), a prospect that has a probability of p of resulting in 
A and a probability of 1-p of resulting in X, is better than a prospect that has a 
probability p of resulting in C and probability 1-p of resulting in X. 
 
We could weaken the condition by for instance requiring p to be arbitrarily close to 1. But 
whether we weaken it or not, Prospect Total Utilitarianism violates the condition. And the reason 
is the same as the reason why Total Utilitarianism leads to the Repugnant Conclusion, namely, that 
if a population with low average welfare is sufficiently large, then it is by what we might call “total 
views” deemed better than a smaller population consisting of people with very high welfare. 
Therefore, if C in the statement of Probabilistic Quality is sufficiently large, then even though people 
in C have low welfare, any prospect between C and X will be deemed better than a prospect 
between A and X, irrespective of X. 
In comparison with other axiologies, Total Utilitarianism handles (non-risky) cases involving 
negative welfare better than most alternative axiologies, such as Average and Critical-Level 
Utilitarianism (more on which below). For example, Total Utilitarianism clearly avoids the Very 
Sadistic Conclusion which is implied by Critical-Level Utilitarianism:11 
 
9 The Very Repugnant Conclusion: For any perfectly equal population with very high positive welfare, and for any number 
of lives with very negative welfare, there is a population consisting of the lives with negative welfare and lives with very 
low positive welfare which is better than the high welfare population, other things being equal. 
11 For a discussion, see (Arrhenius forthcoming, 2000a, 2000b). Average Utilitarianism has similar problems. 
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The Very Sadistic Conclusion: For any population with negative welfare, there is a 
population with positive welfare which is worse, other things being equal 
 
Unlike Total Utilitarianism, Prospect Total Utilitarianism has counterintuitive implications 
when it comes to people with negative welfare. For instance, the view leads to what we might call 
the Risky Very Sadistic Conclusion:12  
 
The Risky Very Sadistic Conclusion: For any arbitrarily high probability p < 1 and any 
population A consisting of lives with very high positive welfare, and any population B 
consisting of lives with very negative welfare, there is a population C consisting of lives 
with very low positive welfare such that a prospect that with probability p results in B 
and with probability 1-p results in C is better than a prospect that will for sure result in 
A.  
 
The following diagram illustrates the above result: 
 
 
A C B 
p 1-p Probability: 1 
 
Figure 1. 
 
In this diagram, the A-people have very high positive welfare, the B-people have very 
negative welfare, and the C-people have very low positive welfare. (The width of the blocks 
represents the number of lives in the population, the height represents their welfare; dashes indicate 
that the block in question should strictly speaking be much wider than shown.) The diagram 
 
12 We note that Budolfson and Spears (mimeo) discuss a more general result, which they call the Probabilistic Very 
Repugnant Conclusion. A proper comparison of the results we discuss here to the results discussed by Budolfson and 
Spears will have to await another occasion.  
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represents two prospects, indicated by the unbroken vertical line, one prospect that results in A for 
sure and another that results in either B or C (the dashed line separates possible outcomes in the 
latter prospect). Now, for any probability p, however high, if there are sufficiently many C-people, 
then the expected total welfare of prospect P, which has probability p of resulting in B and 
probability 1-p of resulting in C, will be higher than the expected total welfare of prospect Q, which 
results in A for sure. Thus, Prospect Total Utilitarianism deems P better than Q. This holds 
irrespective of how much the B-people suffer and of how many they are. In other words, while 
Total Utilitarianism avoids the Very Sadistic Conclusion, Prospect Total Utilitarianism recommends 
prospects that will almost certainly result in a “very sadistic conclusion” (hence the name of the 
conclusion).13 
Now, one might think that the above problem is just a general implication of Expected Utility 
Theory (EUT), that has nothing specifically to do with population ethics. After all, EUT, which 
inspired the above way of turning Total Utilitarianism into a prospect axiology, implies that for any 
desirable outcome X, there is a fantastic outcome Y and a terrible outcome Z, such that for any 
probability p<1, one should prefer a prospect that has probability p of resulting in Z and probability 
1-p of resulting in Y, to a “prospect” that is sure to result in X. In other words, EUT has 
implications with the same structure as the Risky Very Sadistic Conclusion. 
In response, we would like to point out that while one might see the Risky Very Sadistic 
Conclusion as a special case of a more general implication of EUT, that does not change the fact 
that the special case in question is illuminating for debates in population ethics. In particular, it 
teaches us something important about Total Utilitarianism, namely, that while the theory may 
deliver the intuitively right result for some paradigmatic cases involving negative welfare under 
certainty, it leads to counterintuitive results for cases with negative welfare under risk.14 
Faced with the Repugnant Conclusion and other similar problems, a Utilitarian might be 
tempted to opt for a non-total version of the theory, such as Average Utilitarianism or Critical-
 
13 Some may dislike the name of this conclusion for the following reason: Total utilitarians think that the population 
with negative welfare is the worst of the possible populations involved in the above prospect; hence, the Risky Very 
Sadistic Conclusion differs in an important respect from the ordinary Very Sadistic Conclusion, where critical-level 
utilitarians think that a population with negative welfare is better than one with positive welfare. (Thanks to […] for 
bringing this objection to our attention.) Nevertheless, we think that the label is apt for the reason explained above: 
The Very Risky Sadistic Conclusion will almost certainly result in an outcome analogous to the outcome of the Very 
Sadistic Conclusion.  
14 One might argue that this means that while Total Utilitarians have traditionally bashed Average Utilitarians with the 
Very Sadistic Conclusions, Average Utilitarians now have a simple response: The most natural extension of Total 
Utilitarianism to situations of risk and uncertainty will endorse prospects that have a probability arbitrarily close to 1 
of resulting in the very same outcome as the “sadistic” one in the Very Sadistic Conclusion. There are of course possible 
responses that Total Utilitarians could make (e.g. opting for a factualist criterion of betterness and leaving prospects 
problems to their preferred decision method). We shall not pursue this issue further here. For a discussion of the 
distinction between criterions and decision methods, see (Bales 1971), (Brink 1986 pp. 421–7), and (Danielsson 1974 
pp. 28–9). 
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Level Utilitarianism, which can respectively be extended to Prospect Average Utilitarianism and 
Prospect Critical Level Utilitarianism. It is easy to see (e.g. below) that these theories avoid the 
Repugnant Conclusion. However, as is well known, these alternatives to Total Utilitarianism have, 
in the risk-free setting, their own counterintuitive conclusions to deal with; conclusions that are 
arguably at least as counterintuitive as the Repugnant Conclusion.15 It should be evident that since 
Prospect Average Utilitarianism and Prospect Critical Level Utilitarianism are extensions of 
Average Utilitarianism and Critical Level Utilitarianism to risky situations, they inherit in risk-free 
situations the problems of their ancestors.16 Moreover, it turns out that Prospect Average 
Utilitarianism and Prospect Critical Level Utilitarianism—and, in fact, any population prospect 
axiology that satisfies transitivity and a weak dominance condition—faces additional problems due 
to the introduction of uncertainty, as we shall see in section IV. 
To appreciate some of the problems that non-total Utilitarian theories are faced with, let’s 
look more closely at Average Utilitarianism, according to which the value of a population is found 
by summing up the welfare of the lives in the population and dividing this sum with the number 
of lives in the population.17 (After examining Average Utilitarianism and its prospect extension, 
we shall briefly discuss Critical Level Utilitarianism and its prospect extension.) Hence, the 
contributive value of a life depends on the average welfare of the population of which it is a 
member: The contributive value of a life is positive (negative, neutral) if the life has a higher (lower, 
same) welfare than the average welfare in the population. 
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Now, we can extend this theory to situations of risk—thus creating Prospect Average 
Utilitarianism—in an analogues way to how Total Utilitarianism was extended to Prospect Total 
Utilitarianism: 
 
𝑃𝐴𝑈(𝑃) =∑𝑝(𝑠𝑖)𝐴𝑈(𝑃(𝑠𝑖))
𝑚
𝑖=1
 
 
15 See, e.g., (Parfit 1984; Arrhenius 2000a, forthcoming).  
16 The same holds for the recent prospect axiology presented in (Asheim and Zuber 2016) which is an extension of 
the population axiology in (Asheim and Zuber 2014). The latter violates some arguably compelling adequacy 
conditions, such as the Non-Extreme Priority Condition (Arrhenius forthcoming). 
17 The problem with Average Utilitarianism that we focus on here also rises for Critical Level Utilitarianism. See 
(Arrhenius 2000b, 2000a, forthcoming). 
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Average Utilitarianism gives rise to the Sadistic Conclusion:18  
 
The Sadistic Conclusion: It can be better to add to a population people with negative rather 
than positive welfare, other things being equal. 
 
After all, adding a few lives with negative welfare to population X could affect the average 
welfare of the resulting population less negatively than adding to X a lot of lives with positive 
welfare that is nevertheless lower than the average welfare in X. Even worse, Average Utilitarianism 
violates the following seemingly unassailable principle, which is even logically weaker than what is 
required to avoid the Sadistic Conclusion:19 
 
Weak Non-Sadism: There is a negative welfare level and a number of lives at this level 
such that an addition of any number of people with positive welfare is at least as good 
as an addition of the negative welfare lives, other things being equal. 
 
Prospect Average Utilitarianism has the above counterintuitive consequences as well, most 
straightforwardly in the special case where one population has probability 1. Furthermore, Prospect 
Average Utilitarianism violates the following probabilistic analogue of Weak Non-Sadism, even 
when the probabilities involved are strictly between 0 and 1: 
 
Probabilistic Weak Non-Sadism: For any background population, for any population X, 
and for any population Y consisting of lives with very positive welfare, and for any 
probability p, there is a very negative welfare level and a number of lives at this level, 
call this population Z, such that a prospect that has probability p of resulting in the 
addition of X to the background population and probability 1-p of resulting instead in 
the addition of Y, is better than a prospect that has probability p of resulting in the 
addition of X to the background population and a probability 1-p of resulting instead 
in the addition of Z.  
 
The reason why Prospect Average Utilitarianism violates Probabilistic Weak Non-Sadism is 
the same as the reason why Average Utilitarianism violates Weak Non-Sadism. Take any population 
 
18 See, e.g., (Arrhenius 2000a). 
19 A welfare level is simply an equivalence class on the set of possible lives. 
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A where, say, the majority has very high welfare. Then according to what we might call “average 
views”, if a subpopulation of A consisting of people with negative welfare is sufficiently small, then 
its effect on the overall value of population A is less negative than the effect of a larger 
subpopulation of A with, say, only slightly positive welfare. So, in particular, if the population Z in 
the statement of Probabilistic Weak Non-Sadism is sufficiently small, then although the people in 
Z have negative welfare, a Prospect Average Utilitarian should prefer risking adding Z to any 
background population to risking adding Y to the background population.   
Moreover, while Average Utilitarianism (and Critical Level Utilitarianism) of course avoids 
the risk-free Repugnant Conclusion, Prospect Average Utilitarianism (and Prospect Critical Level 
Utilitarianism as well as of Prospect Total Utilitarianism) leads to what we might call the Risky 
Repugnant Conclusion:  
 
The Risky Repugnant Conclusion: For any arbitrarily low probability p>0, any perfectly 
equal population A consisting of people with very high positive welfare, and any 
population C consisting of people with low welfare (including both slightly positive 
and very negative welfare), there is a population B consisting of lives with very high 
welfare, higher than in A, such that a prospect that with probability p results in B and 
with probability 1-p results in C is better than a prospect that will for sure result in A.  
 
The following diagram illustrates the above result: 
 
 
A C B 
p 1-p Probability: 1 
 
Figure 2. 
 
The above result means that while Average Utilitarianism (and Critical Level Utilitarianism) 
avoids the Repugnant Conclusion, Prospect Average Utilitarianism (and Prospect Critical Level 
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Utilitarianism) recommends prospects that will almost certainly result in a Repugnant Conclusion, 
that is, in the special case where C is a huge population consisting of lives with very low positive 
welfare.  
For the sake of completeness, and to convince the reader that Prospect Critical Level 
Utilitarianism really does lead to the Risky Repugnant Conclusion, it is worth formally stating the 
theory. The general intuition behind Critical Level Utilitarianism is that only people with welfare 
that is above some “critical level”, which is typically assumed to be higher than the point at which 
life becomes worth living, can increase the value of a population. More precisely, the risk-free 
version of the theory states that for some critical level c>0,20 the value of a population X is given 
by: 
𝐶𝐿𝑈(𝑋) =∑𝑢𝑖 − 𝑐
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
 
Blackorby et.al. (2005) have extended standard Critical Level Utilitarianism to a prospect 
theory by essentially applying expected utility theory to prospects involving populations where each 
population is valuated by the above formula. That is, they extend Critical Level Utilitarianism in 
the same way as we have extended Average and Total Utilitarianism (albeit using a somewhat 
different notation and formal framework than we do). The resulting theory states that:  
 
𝑃𝐶𝐿𝑈(𝑃) =∑𝑝(𝑠𝑖)𝐶𝐿𝑈(𝑃(𝑠𝑖))
𝑚
𝑖=1
 
  
It should be evident that while Critical Level Utilitarianism was partly designed to avoid the 
Repugnant Conclusion, Prospect Critical Level Utilitarianism leads to the Risky Repugnant 
Conclusion. For as long as the people in the B population are sufficiently high above the critical 
level, then Prospect Critical Level Utilitarianism will instruct us to gamble on B rather than getting 
A for sure, irrespective of how much more likely C is than B. 
Now, Average or Critical Level Utilitarians could avoid this result by postulating that there 
is a limit to how high a person’s welfare can be. But what we take this and the previous result to 
illustrate—and the point we want to emphasise—is that new problems appear when we try to turn 
a population axiology into a population prospect axiology. For, as we have seen, natural 
 
20 It is worth noting that c need not be a constant, but can be a function of the size of the evaluated population 
(Blackorby et.al. 2005). 
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formulations of each of the three standard versions of Utilitarianism lead to prospect-versions of 
the conclusions that they avoid in the risk-free settings.21  
For the remainder of this paper, the question we will focus on is whether the impossibility 
results that have been proven for risk-free population axiology—i.e., results showing that no 
population axiology can satisfy different sets of intuitively compelling adequacy conditions—also 
hold in risky settings. As has been shown in risk-free population axiology, there is a great advantage 
to focusing on exploring the logical consistency of different adequacy conditions, rather than 
formulating new theories in response to the deficiencies that have been found in the old theories. 
One can always formulate a theory that avoids a certain counterintuitive conclusion, but when it 
comes to population ethics, we have results showing that such a theory will imply some other 
unappealing result (some of which we discuss below). Hence, we risk chasing an illusory goal 
forever. With the adequacy-condition-approach, however, we will know with certainty which sets 
of considered intuitions are collectively consistent.  
In the spirit of our favoured approach, we shall, in the next section, introduce a weak and 
very plausible condition that ensures that the ranking of population prospects coheres with the 
ranking of populations. As we show in section IV, this condition suffices to generate impossibility 
results for population prospect axiology that are similar to the traditional impossibility results for 
(risk-free) population axiology. Moreover, as we shall explain in section IV, something like the 
condition introduced in the next section is needed to generate impossibility results for population 
prospect axiologies, since the traditional adequacy conditions for risk-free population axiology say 
nothing whatsoever about how to rank prospects. 
 
III. Population State Dominance 
As an illustration of a rather straightforward comparison of population prospects, consider 
prospects P1 and P2 in Table 1. We shall assume, both in the below example and throughout this 
paper, that the only axiologically relevant features at stake are, first, the welfare of the people in the 
populations that the prospects might result in, and, second, the probabilities that the prospects 
result in these populations.22 Moreover, in the example below, we assume that the only person 
whose welfare P1 and P2 affect is Ann, who will for sure exist and lead a horrible and suffering life 
(denoted by “Ann: -100”), which we assume is not worth living, if we choose P2. The same is true 
 
21 However, note that even in the non-risky case, Average Utilitarianism implies repugnant-like conclusions. See e.g., 
(Arrhenius forthcoming, 2000b). 
22 Cf. fn. 8. 
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if we choose P1 and state of the world s1 obtains. However, in state s2 the choice of P1 means that 
Ann will not exist (which we denote by ‘Ω’). 
 
 s1 s2 
P1 Ann: -100 Ω 
P2 Ann: -100 Ann: -100 
Table 1. 
 
    It seems evident that P1 is better than P2. After all, Ann is sure to lead a suffering life given 
the choice of P2, but she could be spared these sufferings given the choice of P1.  
The judgement that P1 is better than P2 follows from the combination of two very compelling 
principles. One of these principles, Negative Mere Addition, is an uncontroversial and generally 
accepted adequacy condition for (risk-free) population axiologies, and should also be 
uncontroversial, we surmise, for population prospect axiologies:23 
 
Negative Mere Addition: An addition of lives with negative welfare makes a population 
worse, other things being equal. 
 
The other principle is an instance of the well-known State-Wise Dominance principle from 
decision theory. The role of this principle, which is rarely questioned as a normative constraint, is 
to ensure that the ranking of prospects coheres with the ranking of the outcomes (in our case, the 
populations) that the prospects could result in.24 We can see no reason why one would reject this 
as an adequacy condition for population prospect axiologies, assuming, as we have done, that the 
only axiologically relevant feature at stake is the welfare of the people involved and the probabilities 
of the possible populations (more on this below).25 
Now consider again the two prospects in Table 1, P1 and P2. Since we individuate populations 
according to the people in them and the people’s welfare, prospects P1 and P2 result in the same 
population if state s1 obtains. That is, given the previous notation, P1(s1)=P2(s1). And, of course, 
 
23 Recall that we stipulate that lives with negative welfare are worth not living. 
24 The classical theories of rational choice under uncertainty—such as Ramsey’s (1926), Savage’s (1954), and Jeffrey’s 
(1965)—all impose State-Wise Dominance for the type of situations we are considering, i.e., situations where the states’ 
probabilities are unaffected by the agents’ choice. 
25 It might be worth mentioning that unlike Event-Wise Dominance, State-Wise Dominance does not rule out 
intuitively reasonable risk attitudes that that are inconsistent with standard expected utility theory, such as the so-called 
Allais Preference (named after Maurice Allais 1953).  
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every population is as good as itself. But even if this were not how we wanted to individuate 
populations, we would still find that P1(s1) and P2(s1) are equally good, assuming that we accept the 
following very plausible principle: if populations X and Y consist of the same people and each 
person has the same welfare in X as in Y, then X and Y are equally good (other things being equal). 
So, P1(s1) and P2(s1) are equally good. However, P1(s2) is better than P2(s2) according to Negative 
Mere Addition. So, if s1 obtains then P1 and P2 are equally good but if s2 obtains then P1 is better 
than P2. Hence, we have a dominance argument in favour of P1 over P2. 
The principle that underwrites the above dominance reasoning is, as previously mentioned, 
an instance of the traditional State-Wise Dominance principle. Let’s call this instance of the 
principle Population State Dominance: 
 
Population State Dominance: If for all states si, population P1(si) is at least as good as P2(si), 
then prospect P1 is at least as good as P2, other things being equal; and if, in addition, 
for at least one non-null26 state sj, population P1(sj) is better than P2(sj), then prospect 
P1 is better than P2, other things being equal. 
 
It might be worth noting that just like State-Wise Dominance, Population State Dominance 
entails that the value of an outcome cannot depend on what other outcomes the prospect might 
result in, assuming that the outcome has been described in in sufficient detail for the application 
of the principle to be legitimate—in our case, assuming that the value of the relevant population 
has been described in sufficient detail. In other words, the principle rules out value dependencies 
across different states of the world.27 We can think of only one (ultimately misguided) objection 
to this constraint in the present context. Suppose populations A and B consist of different but 
equally many people, all having the same very high welfare, and that we deem A and B to be equally 
good in all other respects. And imagine that we are comparing a prospect that will result in A for 
sure (i.e., the prospect results in A in all states of the world) with a prospect that that has, say, a 0.5 
chance of resulting in A and a 0.5 chance of resulting in B (i.e., the prospect results in A in some 
states of the world but results in B in other states). Then many people have the intuition that the 
second prospect is strictly better than the first, which might seem to violate Population State 
 
26 A state is non-null if it has some chance of obtaining. 
27 Note however that the fact that knowledge of what could have been can affect people’s welfare is not an argument 
against Population State Dominance, since such effects would be reflected in the individual welfare measure. 
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Dominance. After all, the second prospect but not the first gives the B-people a chance to exist 
and lead lives worth living.28 
Should we give up Population State Dominance in response to the above objection? We 
think not. Note that the principle, as we have stated it, has a ceteris paribus clause: “other things being 
equal”. Now, if there is value to giving a person a chance of existing with positive welfare that is 
not exhausted by what is good for the person in question, then other things are not equal in the 
above purported counterexample to Population State Dominance. Hence, Population State 
Dominance would not say that the prospect that results in A for sure is at least as good as the 
prospect that has an equal chance of resulting in A as in B. So, the value of giving people a chance 
does not undermine Population State Dominance. For the purpose of our argument, however, we 
can assume that things other than the welfare, number, and identities of individuals are equal. In 
particular, the importance of the results we shall discuss in the next section is not threatened by 
this assumption. 
Perhaps additional counterexamples to Population State Dominance will come to light. In 
that event, we would have three options: First, to examine whether the examples fall under the 
ceteris paribus clause; second, to examine whether the purported counterexamples can be avoided by 
building the value dependencies into the individual welfare measure;29 and, finally, if the first two 
attempts to rescue Population State Dominance fail, we could examine whether the principle can 
be plausibly weakened. However, since we are not aware of any further objections to Population 
State Dominance, we will continue to take it for granted.  
Let’s return then to our example from Table 1. Note that since “is at least as good as” is a 
reflexive relation, any population is at least as good as itself. Hence, Population State Dominance 
and Negative Mere Addition together entail the following principle, which we have been implicitly 
assuming:30,31  
 
 
28 Diamond (1967) uses an example with this structure to criticise the much stronger Sure Thing Principle. For further 
discussion, see e.g. Broome (1991) and Stefánsson (2015). 
29 Stefánsson (2015) shows how one can formally construct such a measure.  
30 More generally, Population State Dominance and Negative Mere Addition together entail:  
 
General Negative Existential Risk Dominance: If for all states si such that i≠j, P1(si) is equally as good as 
P2(si), and there is a state sj such that the only difference between P1(sj) and P2(sj) is that P2(sj) contains 
a life with negative welfare that P1(sj) does not contain, then P1 is better than P2, other things being 
equal. 
31 It is worth pointing out that the difference between P1 and P2, i.e., a life with negative welfare and positive welfare, 
is outside of the set of factors which are assumed to be equal across the prospects we consider. For as the reader may 
recall, that set does not include the number and identities of people. Therefore, Population State Dominance does 
entail, in the presence of Negative Mere Addition, that P1 is better than P2. 
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Negative Existential Risk Dominance: If for all states si such that i≠j, P1(si) is identical to 
P2(si), and there is a state sj such that the only difference between P1(sj) and P2(sj) is 
that P2(sj) contains a life with negative welfare that P1(sj) does not contain, then P1 is 
better than P2, other things being equal. 
 
Since both Negative Mere Addition and Population State Dominance should be taken as 
adequacy conditions for a satisfactory population prospect axiology, we contend, any adequate 
population prospect axiology should satisfy Negative Existential Risk Dominance, and should thus 
deem P1 to be better than P2. 
How do the population prospect axiologies discussed above fare with respect to Negative 
Mere Addition and Population State Dominance? Population State Dominance is satisfied by all 
the above-mentioned theories, and, we contend, by any plausible prospect axiology (with the 
caveats discussed above). Prospect Total Utilitarianism and Prospect Critical Level Utilitarianism 
also satisfy Negative Mere Addition and thus satisfy Negative Existential Risk Dominance. 
However, Prospect Average Utilitarianism violates Negative Mere Addition (just like Average 
Utilitarianism does), and, indeed, Negative Existential Risk Dominance.  
As an illustration of why Prospect Average Utilitarianism violates Negative Existential Risk 
Dominance, consider again prospects P1 and P2 in Table 1, and recall that the only difference 
between P1(s2) and P2(s2) is that the latter contains Ann leading a horrible and suffering life—with 
welfare -100—whereas Ann does not exist in the former (no other person is affected by the choice 
between these two prospects). Now, if Ann’s welfare in P2(s2), although negative, is higher than the 
average welfare in P2(s2) when Ann’s welfare has been excluded, then the addition of Ann with this 
negative welfare improves the average welfare of the population. Hence, P2(s2) is better than P1(s2), 
according to Average Utilitarianism.32 Finally, since according to Prospect Average Utilitarianism, 
the value of P1 is a (possibly weighted)33 average between the values of P1(s1) and P1(s2), and similarly 
for P2, Prospect Average Utilitarianism deems P2 better than P1, in violation of Negative Existential 
Risk Dominance. 
 
 
32 One might think that the Average Utilitarian value of P1(s2) is undefined since nobody exists in s2. That would mean 
that P1(s2) could not be better than P2(s2) according to Average Utilitarianism. However, that would be to 
misunderstand the example. We are not assuming that only Ann can exist, and thus that nobody exists in P1(s2). Rather, 
we are assuming that only Ann is affected by the choice between P1 and P2.  
33 That is, if s1 and s2 are not equiprobable. 
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IV. A Population Prospect Impossibility Theorem 
To answer the general question about the possibility of an adequate population prospect axiology, 
we can exploit the generally accepted and much studied adequacy conditions for (risk-free) 
population axiology, and add to them Population State Dominance, which, as previously 
mentioned, we take to be an adequacy condition for population prospect axiology. Although the 
traditional (risk-free) adequacy conditions are known to be mutually inconsistent as conditions on 
how to rank outcomes, they are not mutually inconsistent as conditions on how to rank prospects, 
since none of them says anything about how to rank prospects. Hence, a condition like Population 
State Dominance is needed, to connect the ranking of outcomes to the ranking of prospects.  
We shall focus on three adequacy conditions for (risk-free) population axiology that generate 
a very simple and easy to demonstrate impossibility theorem, which we will extend to population 
prospect axiology. Some of these conditions can be and have been questioned. However, as will 
become evident, the various other impossibility theorems that have been proven with logically 
weaker and intuitively more compelling adequacy conditions for population axiology (see, e.g., 
Arrhenius forthcoming) can be extended to population prospect axiology in a way analogous to 
how we extend the simple theorem. So, the aim here is not to prove an impossibility theorem 
involving only intuitively compelling adequacy conditions, but to illustrate how one can translate 
all theorems for (risk-free) population axiology into theorems for prospect population axiology on 
a domain that contains non-trivial prospects (i.e., prospects that confer chances strictly between 0 
and 1 on different populations). 
The three adequacy conditions are: 
 
Egalitarian Dominance: If A is a perfectly equal population of the same size as population 
B, and every person in A has higher welfare than every person in B, then A is better 
than B, other things being equal. 
 
Quantity: For any pair of positive welfare levels a and b, such that b is slightly lower 
than a, and for any number of lives n, there is a greater number of lives m, such that a 
population of m people at level b is at least as good as a population of n people at level 
a, other things being equal.  
 
Quality: There is a perfectly equal population with very high welfare which is at least as 
good as any population with very low positive welfare, other things being equal. 
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Egalitarian Dominance is as uncontroversial as a principle of population ethics gets. Quality 
is a condition that rules out theories that imply the Repugnant Conclusion. Quantity may have less 
immediate intuitive appeal than the first two, but it should appeal to those who find some truth in 
the saying “the more good, the better”.  
Now, it turns out that the above seemingly week conditions are not mutually compatible, as 
illustrated by the following simple and well-known impossibility theorem (for risk-free population 
axiology): 
 
Simple Impossibility Theorem: There is no population axiology which satisfies 
Egalitarian Dominance, Quality, and Quantity.34 
 
 
A1  A2    A3 
… 
Ar B 
 
Figure 3. 
 
To see why the above theorem is true, consider the sequence in Figure 3. Assume that A1 in 
the diagram above is a population with very high welfare and that B is a population with very low 
positive welfare (again, the width of the blocks represents the number of lives in the population, 
the height represents their welfare; dashes indicate that the block in question should really be much 
wider than shown). According to Quantity, there is a population A2 with slightly lower welfare than 
A1 which is at least as good as A1; a population A3 with slightly lower welfare than A2 which at least 
as good as A2; and so forth. Hence, we will finally reach population Ar with very low positive 
welfare.35 By transitivity, Ar is at least as good as A1. But B is better than Ar according to Egalitarian 
 
34 This theorem was first presented in (Arrhenius 2000b) where exact statements of these conditions also can be 
found. See also (Arrhenius 2016). 
35 This presupposes that the welfare levels in this sequence of populations satisfy a structural assumption which has 
been called Finite Fine-grainedness: There exists a finite sequence of slight welfare differences between any two welfare 
levels.  The idea behind this weak structural assumption is that one can get from one welfare level to another in a finite 
number of steps of intuitively slight welfare difference. Examples of such welfare differences could be some minor 
pain or pleasure or a shortening of life by a minute or two. For a precise definition of “slight welfare difference” and 
a discussion of  possible theories of welfare that violate Finite Fine-grainedness, see (Arrhenius and Rabinowicz 2015; 
Arrhenius 2016, 2000b, 2011, forthcoming, 2005). For an interesting effort to challenge this structural assumption (in 
light of the impossibility theorems in population ethics), see (Carlson forthcoming) and (Thomas 2017). 
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Dominance. Hence, by transitivity, B is better than A1. However, by Quality, A1 is at least as good 
as B. So, we get a contradiction: B is better than A1 which is at least as good as B. Hence, the Simple 
Impossibility Theorem: there is no population axiology which satisfies Egalitarian Dominance, 
Quality, and Quantity. 
It is rather easy to see that the Simple Impossibility Theorem can be extended to the 
following impossibility result for population prospect axiologies, even if we assume that all 
prospects in the theories domain are non-trivial (in the sense described above): 
 
Simple Prospect Impossibility Theorem: There is no population prospect axiology 
which satisfies Egalitarian Dominance, Quality, Quantity, and Population State 
Dominance. 
 
 s1 s2 
P1 C A1 
P2 C A2 
… … … 
Pr C Ar 
Pr+1 C B 
Table 2. 
 
P1 to Pr+1 are different population prospects, whereas s1 and s2 are different states of the world 
that determine which population results from the choice of each prospect. We assume that both 
the prospects in Table 2 above and those in Table 3 below (Q1 to Qr+1) are non-trivial, meaning 
that the probabilities of states s1 and s2 are strictly between zero and one.  
Now, A1, A2, etc., and B in Table 2 are the populations depicted in Figure 3. So, for each Ai, 
Ai+1 is at least as good as Ai according to Quantity, B is better than Ar according to Egalitarian 
Dominance, and thus B is better than A1 by transitivity. However, A1 is at least as good as B 
according to Quality. But that means that according to Population State Dominance, Pr+1 is better 
than P1 and P1 is at least as good as Pr+1, irrespective of what population C represents. So, again we 
reach a contradiction. Hence, the Simple Prospect Impossibility Theorem: there is no population 
prospect axiology which satisfies Egalitarian Dominance, Quality, Quantity, and Population State 
Dominance. 
It might be worth reminding the reader of a point that we previously made, namely, that 
prospect impossibility results like those proven above cannot be achieved by only using risk-free 
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adequacy conditions, such as Egalitarian Dominance, Quantity, and Quality. For while these risk-
free conditions tell us how to rank outcomes, they tell us nothing about how to rank prospects that can 
result in different outcomes. For instance, while Egalitarian Dominance, Quality, and Quantity 
together entail that B is better than A1 and that A1 is at least as good as B, that does not suffice to 
get an impossibility result for prospects, since this non-transitive outcome-ranking by itself does 
not preclude that there exists an adequate (in particular, transitive) population prospect ranking.  
More generally, to derive a prospect impossibility result, one either has to use a condition 
like Population State Dominance, to connect the ranking of outcomes to the ranking of prospects; 
or one has to reformulate some or all of the standard conditions as prospect conditions (a 
possibility we explore blow). For instance, while Egalitarian Dominance, Quantity, and Quality are 
mutually inconsistent as conditions on how to rank outcomes, these three conditions are by 
themselves mutually consistent as conditions on how to rank prospects. After all, conditions that say 
nothing about how to rank prospects are obviously mutually consistent as conditions on how to 
rank prospects.  
Another approach, briefly mentioned above, would be to reformulate all of Egalitarian 
Dominance, Quality, and Quantity as prospect conditions by building Population State Dominance 
into the original conditions. Consider for instance the following conditions:  
 
Egalitarian Prospect Dominance: For any population C and any probability p, if A is a 
perfectly equal population of the same size as population B, and every person in A has 
higher welfare than every person in B, then a prospect that with probability p results 
in A and with probability 1-p results in C is better than a prospect that with probability 
p results in B and with probability 1-p results in C, other things being equal. 
 
Quantity Prospect Dominance: For any population C, any probability p, and any pair of 
positive welfare levels a and b, such that b is slightly lower than a, and for any 
number of lives n, there is a greater number of lives m, such that a prospect that with 
probability p results in a population of m people at level b and with probability 1-p 
results in C, is at least as good as a prospect that with probability p results in a 
population of n people at level a and with probability 1-p results in C, other things 
being equal.  
 
Quality Prospect Dominance: There is a perfectly equal population A with very high welfare 
such that for any population C, for any probability p, and for any population B with 
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very low positive welfare, a prospect that with probability p results in A and with 
probability 1-p results in C is at least as good as a prospect that with probability p results 
in B and with probability 1-p results in C. 
 
Now, it should be straightforward to see that even if the domain is restricted to non-trivial 
prospects, that is, prospects that confer a probability strictly between zero and one on different 
populations, we can prove: 
 
Pure Prospect Impossibility Theorem: There is no population prospect axiology 
which satisfies Egalitarian Prospect Dominance, Quality Prospect Dominance, and 
Quantity Prospect Dominance. 
 
The prospects in Table 2, for instance, establish the Pure Prospect Impossibility Theorem. 
For notice that by transitivity, Egalitarian Prospect Dominance, Quality Prospect Dominance, and 
Quantity Prospect Dominance result in an inconsistent ranking of the prospects in Table 2, in 
exactly the same way as the original Egalitarian Dominance, Quality, Quantity and Population State 
Dominance resulted in an inconsistent ordering of the prospects in Table 2. 
It might also be worth pointing out that the assumption that the different prospects result in 
the same population if one of the two states obtains is not essential to the above results. This holds 
for both the Simple Prospect Impossibility Result and the Pure Prospect Impossibility Result, but 
to keep things simple, we shall focus on the latter. Consider the prospects in Table 3, where we 
have extended the sequence in Figure 3 beyond Ar to Ar+1 and Ar+2, and assume that the new 
population Ar+1 relates to Ar as Ar relates to Ar-1, etc. 
 
 s1 s2 
Q1 A1 A2 
Q2 A2 A3 
… … … 
Qr Ar Ar+1 
Qr+1 B Ar+2 
Table 3. 
 
By Quantity, A2 is at least as good as A1 and A3 is at least as good as A2. More generally, for 
each Ai, Ai+1 is at least as good as Ai. Hence, by Population State Dominance, Q2 is at least as good 
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as Q1, and, continuing this sequence, Qr is at least as good as Qr-1. However, B is better than Ar, so 
by Population State Dominance, Qr+1 is better than Qr. So, by transitivity, Qr+1 is better than Q1. But 
by Quality, A1 is at least as good as B and (we can construct the example such that) A2 is at least as 
good as Ar+2. Therefore, by Population State Dominance, Q1 is at least as good as Qr+1. So, again 
we reach a contradiction: Qr+1 is better than Q1 which is at least as good as Qr+1.36 
Finally, it might be worth noting that impossibility results can be generated by using only 
“pure” prospect adequacy conditions; that is, adequacy conditions that involve only (non-trivial) 
population prospects, but that nevertheless mirror the traditional adequacy conditions involving 
(risk-free) populations.37 Consider the following two conditions: 
 
Probability/Quantity trade-off: For any population A consisting of lives with very high 
welfare, and any population B consisting of lives with very low but positive welfare, 
and any prospect P1 that has probability p>0 of resulting A and probability 1-p of 
resulting in B, there is some probability q<p, and some population C consisting of lives 
at the same welfare level as the B-people, such that a prospect P2 that has probability 
q of resulting in population A and probability 1-q of resulting in the population 
consisting in the union of B with C, is no worse than prospect P1, other things being 
equal. 
 
Probabilistic Average/Total trade-off: There is a perfectly equal population A with very high 
welfare, such that for any two populations B and C consisting of lives with the same 
very low but positive welfare, there are some probabilities p, q, where q<p, such that 
prospect P1 that has probability p of resulting in population A and probability 1-p of 
resulting in B is better than prospect P2 that has probability q of resulting in population 
A and probability 1-q of resulting in the union of B with C, other things being equal. 
 
36 We should also note that an analogous, and equally simple, prospect impossibility result can be derived by combining 
the above three traditional adequacy conditions (i.e., Quantity, Quality, and Egalitarian Dominance) with Stochastic 
Dominance, which can be stated as follows: 
 
Stochastic Dominance: If for any outcome x prospect P1 has at least as high a chance as prospect P2 of resulting 
in an outcome that is at least as good as x, then P1 is at least as good as P2; and if, in addition, for some 
outcome y prospect P1 has a higher chance than prospect P2 of resulting in an outcome that is better than 
y, then P1 is better than P2. 
 
In a framework like the one we are considering (in particular, one that contains states of the world), Stochastic 
Dominance entails State-Wise Dominance. Hence, since we cannot consistently add Population-State Dominance to 
the three traditional adequacy conditions discussed above, we also cannot consistently add Stochastic Dominance to 
these three adequacy conditions. 
37 We thank Tim Campbell for suggesting a result like this. 
24 
 
 
The thought behind Probability/Quantity trade-off is that we can reduce the probability that 
a prospect results in the population A, where people have very high welfare, without making the 
resulting prospect worse, as long as we sufficiently increase the number of people in the alternative 
population that the prospect results in if it does not result in A.38 In contrast, the thought behind 
Probabilistic Average/Total trade-off is that there is a limit to how much average welfare we are 
willing to risk foregoing for the sake of a chance at higher total welfare. As can easily be verified, 
Prospect Average Utilitarianism violates Probability/Quantity trade-off whereas Prospect Total 
Utilitarianism violates Probabilistic Average/Total trade-off.  
To see how Probability/Quantity trade-off and Probabilistic Average/Total trade-off jointly 
lead to inconsistency, given transitivity, suppose we start with a probability p that is close to 1. By 
Probability/Quantity trade-off, there is some quantity δ that we could subtract from p such that 
the following holds. Suppose that prospect P0 has probability p of resulting in a population A 
consisting of lives with very high welfare and probability 1-p of resulting in some population B 
consisting of lives with very low but positive welfare. Moreover, suppose that prospect P1 has 
probability p-δ of resulting in population A and probability 1-(p-δ) of resulting in the union of B 
with some population C consisting of lives with the same low welfare as the B-lives. Then P1 is no 
worse than P0. But continuing this reasoning, we can generate a sequence of prospects, by 
incrementally increasing the size of the quantity that is subtracted from p, until we reach a quantity 
ζ for which the following holds. Suppose that Pn has probability p-ζ of resulting in A and probability 
1-(ζ) of resulting in some population D, which consists of lives with the same low but positive 
welfare as the B-lives but which is much bigger than B (and indeed contains both B and C). Then 
Pn is no worse than the immediately preceding prospect in the sequence. Hence, by transitivity, Pn 
is no worse than P0.39 Since we get this result irrespective of the welfare (and size) of the A 
population, and irrespective of p and ζ, we have a violation of Probabilistic Average/Total trade-
off, according to which P0 is better than Pn (for some A, p, ζ, and D).  
 
 
38 One could weaken the principle by excluding the ends of the probability spectrum, i.e., by adding that q is not equal 
to 0 and p is not equal to 1. Weakening the principle in this way would still generate the inconsistency with Probabilistic 
Average/Total trade-off (assuming transitivity). But note that Prospect Total Utilitarianism entails the stronger version, 
where the possible values of p and q are not restricted. 
39 Those who worry about incomparability (or incommensurability), might question this argument, since the relation 
of being no worse than is not transitive when applied to incomparable options. To get around this worry, we could 
strengthen Probability/Quantity trade-off such that it says that P2 is better than P1. The obvious cost of strengthening 
the principle is that some might only accept the weaker version of it. However, the general motivation for the weaker 
principle arguably supports the stronger principle too. In any case, incomparability (and incommensurability) raises 
various interesting questions in population ethics that are beyond the scope of this paper.  
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V. Concluding Remarks 
In conclusion, we have found that there can be no adequate population prospect axiology, since 
no such theory can satisfy conditions that, we contend, any adequate population prospect axiology 
should satisfy. And although we have focused only on five such adequacy conditions, and only one 
of the many impossibility theorems that have been proven for risk-free population axiology, it 
should be evident that the other theorems can be extended to population prospect axiology in an 
analogous way to how we extended the Simple Impossibility Theorem, i.e., by exploiting 
Population State Dominance. 
On one hand, the result of this paper should perhaps not come as a surprise. Given that we 
would want the traditional adequacy conditions from risk-free population axiology to hold when 
ranking the (risk-free) outcomes (i.e., populations) in population prospects, and since we in addition 
want to impose further adequacy conditions that have specifically to do with the introduction of 
uncertainty, we should perhaps not have expected the search for an adequate population prospect 
axiology to be easier than the search for an adequate population axiology. On the other hand, one 
might have hoped that the impossibility theorems from risk-free population ethics could be 
avoided by removing some of their idealizing assumptions, for instance, the assumption that we 
know for sure which population an alternative will result in. But, as we now have seen, removing 
the idealizing assumption of certainty will not help us avoid these impossibility results.40 
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